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We present a two-state practical quantum bit commitment protocol, the security of which is
based on the current technological limitations, namely the non-existence of either stable long-term
quantum memories, or non-demolition measurements. For an optical realization of the protocol,
we model the errors, which occur due to the noise and equipment (source, fibers and detectors)
imperfections, accumulated during emission, transmission and measurement of photons. The optical
part is modeled as a combination of a depolarizing channel (white noise), unitary evolution (e.g.
systematic rotation of the polarization axis of photons) and two other basis-dependent channels, the
phase- and the bit-flip channels. We analyze quantitatively the effects of noise using two common
information-theoretic measures of probability distribution distinguishability: the fidelity and the
relative entropy. In particular, we discuss the optimal cheating strategy and show that it is always
advantageous for a cheating agent to add some amount of white noise – the particular effect not
being present in standard quantum security protocols. We also analyze the protocol’s security when
the use of (im)perfect non-demolition measurements and noisy/bounded quantum memories are
allowed. Finally, we discuss errors occurring due to a finite detector efficiency, dark counts and
imperfect single-photon sources and show to have the same effects as those of standard quantum
cryptography.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex
I. BIT COMMITMENT
Among security tasks, the bit commitment protocol
holds a prominent role as it represents a computational
primitive for many important information processing
protocols. It is a two-party protocol that consists of two
phases: the commitment and the opening phases. In the
commitment phase, one client (Alice) commits to a value
of a bit (commits to either 0 or 1) at a certain moment
in time t0. After performing the commitment, Alice fi-
nalizes the protocol by revealing (opening) her choice to
the other client (Bob), at some later moment in time t1.
The commitment to a certain value could be seen, for in-
stance, as a promise to either perform a certain action in
a future moment in time t2 ≥ t1 (e.g. buy a house from
Bob for a given fixed price X) – commitment to 1, or
not – commitment to 0. The protocol has to fulfill three
security requirements: Alice cannot change her commit-
ment later in time, in particular during the opening phase
(the protocol is binding); Bob cannot learn Alice’s com-
mitment before the opening phase (the protocol is con-
cealing); if both clients are honest (if they execute the
protocol according to the rules), then Bob will success-
fully open Alice’s commitment (the protocol is viable).
Commitment schemes are nowadays an important phase
on several cryptographic protocols, in particular in zero-
∗ ricardoloura@gmail.com, npaunkov@math.ist.utl.pt
knowledge proof systems and authentication protocols (for
a more detailed description, see Appendix A).
The idea behind the classical solutions to this prob-
lem is to lock Alice’s commitment in a secure “safe” (the
commitment phase), such that without the key it is im-
possible to break into it, and give that “safe” to Bob.
During the opening phase, Alice gives Bob the key, and
he learns her commitment. One way of doing this is to use
ordinary keys and locks. Another, to perform the locking
by encrypting the commitment, using a secret encryption
key. In both cases, the solutions have to meet the bind-
ing and concealment requirements. Unfortunately, it is
not possible to perform a bit commitment protocol that
is unconditionally secure. If Alice chooses to protect her
commitment by placing it in a real safe, since there are
no unbreakable safes, the protocol would not be uncon-
ditionally concealing. If she chooses to protect her com-
mitment by encrypting it using a secret key known only
by her, she can achieve the concealing requirement, but
then the protocol would no longer be binding. Namely,
no unbreakable encryption scheme is at the same time
binding – whatever commitment value Alice encrypted
during the commitment phase, she can always present
a suitable key that would decrypt to either of the two
commitment values.
Attempts to solve this problem using quantum systems
have been done previously [1], but it was shown that no
quantum bit commitment protocol can be both uncon-
ditionally binding and concealing [2]. Nevertheless, it is
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2possible to, using the current technological limitations,
perform a practical quantum bit commitment protocol
that will be secure in a foreseeable future [3]. The proto-
col is based on the famous BB84 quantum cryptographic
protocol [4]. The proposed protocol is binding, due to
the unconditional security of the BB84 protocol [5] and
the fact that we do not have long-term stable quantum
memories, nor do we have apparatuses able to perform
non-demolition measurements of photons. Practical bit
commitment protocols whose security is based on lim-
ited amount of quantum memories were studied previ-
ously [6], as well as protocols whose security is based
on having imperfect (due to unavoidable noise) quantum
memories [7]. One such protocol, using entangled states,
was recently reported to be experimentally performed [8].
Finally, we note that the above no-go theorem on uncon-
ditional security of (quantum) bit commitment schemes
is applicable only to non-relativistic protocols. Using rel-
ativistic effects, it is possible to design an unconditionally
secure bit commitment protocol [9], which was recently
implemented [10].
In this paper, we present a two-state version of the
practical quantum bit commitment protocol based on the
B92 cryptographic protocol [11]. Its practical security
relies on the fact that long-term stable quantum memo-
ries and non-demolition measurements are currently out
of reach. Provided those technological limitations, our
protocol is more secure than classical counterparts, as its
security is based on physical laws, rather than on compu-
tational assumptions. We also study the effects of noise,
source imperfections and measurement errors on the pro-
tocol’s security. In particular, we show that adding a cer-
tain amount of white noise always increases the chances
of a dishonest Alice to cheat Bob and postpone her de-
cision until the opening phase. Finally, we analyze the
security of the protocol in the presence of (im)perfect
non-demolition measurements and noisy/bounded quan-
tum memories.
II. TWO-STATE QUANTUM PROTOCOL
The protocol is based on quantum complementarity
– the impossibility to simultaneously measure two non-
commuting observables. Therefore, one has to decide to
measure only one out of two possible observables of a
physical system, and obtain information about only one
of two features of a system. The choice of measurement
can be interpreted as a commitment to a bit value, and
the measurement outcome used as a proof of this par-
ticular choice (i.e. commitment). This is somewhat the
opposite approach to that used in classical solutions: in-
stead of (securely) imprinting the information of a com-
mitment choice into a state of a physical system (writ-
ing down an encrypted message on a piece of paper, for
example), the choice is done by acquiring information
about only one out of two possible features of a physical
system. This approach has already been used for design-
ing quantum contract signing [12, 13] and simultaneous
dense coding protocols [14]. In those cases, the security
of the protocols is provided by the laws of physics (e.g.
quantum mechanics), rather than by the computational
complexity of the decryption schemes. Also, a “proba-
bilistic” two-state quantum bit string commitment pro-
tocol, based on the same mechanism, was recently pro-
posed [15], in which Alice commits to a string of n bits,
such that Bob can learn not more than m < n bits, up
to negligible probability (note that because this proto-
col is quantum its unconditional security is not implying
the existence of unconditionally secure quantum bit com-
mitment schemes, as would be the case for its classical
counterpart [15]). For similar work on coin tossing and
bit-string generation, see [16–19].
In addition to the commitment and the opening phases,
the quantum protocol begins with the initialization
phase, during which Bob prepares a number of identical
physical two-level systems (qubits) on which Alice is to
perform the commitment measurement (the same mea-
surement on each qubit). Bob sends to Alice a number of
qubits, each randomly prepared in one of two given quan-
tum states (|0〉 or |1〉), without revealing any informa-
tion about the prepared states. During the commitment
phase, Alice chooses only one out of two non-commuting
observables, Cˆ0 or Cˆ1 (given by the two states used by
Bob, see below), measures it on each qubit received from
Bob, and keeps the record of measurement outcomes. Fi-
nally, during the opening phase, she reveals the results
to Bob, which serves as a proof of her commitment.
We require that the qubit states |0〉 and |1〉 used in
the protocol are not orthogonal [45], 〈0|1〉 = cos θ, with
θ ∈ (0, pi/2). Let us denote the states orthogonal to |0〉
and |1〉 as |0⊥〉 and |1⊥〉, respectively: 〈0⊥|0〉 = 0 and
〈1⊥|1〉 = 0. This way, we defined two (orthonormal)
bases B0 = {|0〉, |0⊥〉} and B1 = {|1〉, |1⊥〉}, which in
turn define two orthogonal observables Cˆ0 and Cˆ1:
Cˆ0 = 0·|0〉〈0|+ 1·|0⊥〉〈0⊥| ,
Cˆ1 = 1·|1〉〈1|+ 0·|1⊥〉〈1⊥| .
(1)
Finally, we list the eigenvectors of Cˆ1 expressed [46] in
the B0 basis:
|1〉 = cos θ|0〉+ eiφ sin θ|0⊥〉
|1⊥〉 = sin θ|0〉 − eiφ cos θ|0⊥〉 , (2)
and vice versa:
|0〉 = cos θ|1〉+ sin θ|1⊥〉
|0⊥〉 = e−iφ(sin θ|1〉 − cos θ|1⊥〉) , (3)
for some φ ∈ [0, 2pi).
We can now give a more detailed description of our
two-state practical quantum bit commitment protocol. It
consists of three phases, arranged in chronological order
(T0 < T1 < T2):
The Initialization Phase: At time T0, Bob ran-
domly chooses a string of N bits (b1, b2, . . . bN ), with
3bk ∈ {0, 1}, and sends a string of N qubits to Alice,
each prepared in the pure state |bk〉, and emitted at time
tk, with k ∈ {1, 2, . . . N}. Bob keeps the information of
the states |bk〉 of each qubit, as well as the times tk of the
emission of each qubit. We assume that t1 < t2 < . . . tN
and that tN − t1 << T2 − T1.
The Commitment Phase: At time T1, Alice starts
measuring on all the qubits received only one observ-
able, either Cˆ0 or Cˆ1, depending on her commitment
choice (Cˆ0 corresponds to the commitment to value 0,
Cˆ1 to value 1). She announces the arrival times of each
qubit (which are at the same time the times of measure-
ment of each qubit; see below for the discussion), a string
(τ1, τ2, . . . τn), with τ1 = T1, and keeps the record of
the measurement results to her, a string (r1, r2, . . . rn),
with [47] n ≤ N .
The Opening Phase: At time T2, Alice reveals her
commitment c ∈ {0, 1} (e.g. the measurement observable
Cˆc), together with the measurement results ri, with i ∈
{1, . . . n}, to Bob.
Note that not all qubits sent by Bob arrive to and are
measured by Alice. Thus, n ≤ N , and for each index
i labeling Alice’s measurement times τi and results ri,
there is a corresponding index k = k(i) labeling Bob’s
qubit emission times tk(i) and corresponding bits bk(i).
First, we discuss in more detail the commitment mech-
anism. The description of the commitment phase states
that measuring Cˆ0 corresponds to the commitment to
value 0, while measuring Cˆ1 corresponds to the com-
mitment to value 1. From the expression of measur-
ing observables in terms of the states |0〉 and |1〉, and
the states orthogonal to them, given by equation (1), we
see that when a bit value bk, defining the qubit’s quan-
tum state |bk〉, “coincides” with the measuring observ-
able Cˆc = Cˆbk , i.e. bk = c, then the corresponding mea-
surement outcome ri, for which k = k(i), coincides with
the bit value bk, i.e. ri = bk. This way, we can inter-
pret the measurement outcome ri as Alice’s inference of
Bob’s bit value bk(i): if the bit value and the observable
“coincide”, the inference will be right; otherwise, it will
be random [48]. If by pc(r|b), with c, r, b ∈ {0, 1}, we
denote a conditional probability that a result r is ob-
tained when measuring observable Cˆc on state |b〉, then
the overall conditional probabilities are given by the fol-
lowing expressions,
• Alice measures Cˆ0:
p0(0|0) = 1
p0(1|0) = 0
p0(0|1) = cos2 θ
p0(1|1) = sin2 θ .
(4)
• Alice measures Cˆ1:
p1(0|0) = sin2 θ
p1(1|0) = cos2 θ
p1(0|1) = 0
p1(1|1) = 1 .
(5)
Thus, the above conditional probabilities give the sig-
nature of the commitment: if Alice measures Cˆ0, the
statistics of her measurement outcomes will be given by
(4); otherwise, it will be given by (5). It also serves as the
proof of her commitment, during the opening phase: only
if the statistics of {ri}, with respect to {bk(i)}, is “close
enough” to pc(r|b), did Alice commit to the bit value c.
If n(r|b) is the number of measurements performed by
Alice on qubits received in the state |b〉, with outcome
r, and n(b) is the total number of qubits received in the
state |b〉, then define q(r|b) = n(r|b)n(b) . By “close enough”
to, say, p0(r|b) (c = 0 commitment), we now mean that
the probability P (q||p0) that the measurement statistics
q(r|b) were produced by a random source p0(r|b) is bigger
than a certain threshold value α > 0 (Alice did measure
Cˆ0). This represents Bob’s criterion to accept Alice’s
commitment to c = 0, and analogously for c = 1. More-
over, for the protocol to be viable, we require that the
statistics q(r|b) which pass the test P (q||p0) > α of com-
mitting to value c = 0 are unlikely to be obtained by
measuring Cˆ1, i.e. we require that
P (q||p0) > α⇒ P (q||p1) < β, (6)
(and analogously for statistics that pass the test of com-
mitting to c = 1). The security parameters α and β are
to be set by Bob and the protocol designer, respectively,
depending on the particular equipment used and the de-
sired level of confidence.
Let us now discuss the protocol’s (practical) security
and show that it is indeed both binding and concealing.
The protocol must guarantee that at a certain moment
of time T1, Alice commits to a bit value such that Bob
cannot learn her commitment until she reveals it at time
T2, and Alice cannot change her decision after T1, in
particular at T2.
Alice makes the commitment by measuring one of the
two observables, during a period of time [τ1, τn]. The
protocol requires that Alice announces the arrival times
of the qubits. To do so, she either performs her mea-
surements straight away (meaning that she commits to a
certain value), or she performs a non-demolition measure-
ment, thus detecting the presence of a photon without
either destroying it nor affecting its polarization state.
However, photonic non-demolition measurements are still
in their infancy stage (see [20], [21]). In [21], for instance,
one performs a non-demolition measurement in a con-
trolled environment (photons are in a confined cavity).
This type of measurement is thus suitable for computa-
tional rather than optical cryptographic purposes. Fur-
thermore, even if Alice had access to a non-demolition
4measuring apparatus, she would need, in order to per-
form her measurements later in time, to have access to
stable long-term quantum memories. Despite recent ef-
forts, current technology allows only for very short-term
noisy memories, usually implemented by fiber optic ca-
ble (see Fig. 5 in [8] for an example): adding extra
fiber optic cable makes the measurements much more
prone to errors, and increases the qubit losses exponen-
tially in the length of the cable. Consequently, Alice
performs her measurements as soon as she receives the
qubits sent to her by Bob, turning the arrival times of
each qubit into the measurement times τi as well. There-
fore, τn − τ1 ≤ tN − t1 << T2 − T1, and for all practical
purposes we can say that the commitment in fact oc-
curred at time T1. Note that in the ideal case when all
qubits sent by Bob arrive to Alice and are detected by
her, n = N , we have τi = tk(i) + vl, with v being the
speed of the qubits and l the distance between Alice and
Bob.
For these same reasons, the protocol is binding: Al-
ice must perform her measurements as the qubits arrive,
and thus she must make a commitment at time T1, and
not later. Otherwise, she could have kept the qubits in a
quantum memory and perform her measurements – com-
mit to a value – later in time. On the other hand, as
a consequence of the laws of quantum mechanics, there
exists no measurement which would provide Alice with
the knowledge of the states prepared by Bob for all of
the received qubits: she cannot both know p0(ri|0) and
p1(ri|1) for every i. Thus, after performing her measure-
ments, Alice cannot pass both the test (4) of committing
to the value 0 and the test (5) of committing to the value
1. Note that it is essential that the commitment tests
(4) and (5) contain both p0(ri|0) and p1(ri|1), as well as
p0(ri|1) and p1(ri|0), otherwise the protocol would not
be binding. Indeed, Alice must both be able to identify
states corresponding to her commitment choice and to
have a proper statistics on states not corresponding to
her choice. Otherwise, she could trivially pass both tests
even without any measurements, by simply setting ri = 0
for all i’s, in case she wants to pass the test of committing
to the value 0, and ri = 1 otherwise.
Regarding the second security requirement, that of
concealment, it is obvious that Alice’s measurements re-
veal no information about her measurement outcomes,
and thus of her commitment, to a spatially distant Bob.
Sending entangled states would obviously not help, due
to non-signaling and causality: Bob cannot infer the
choice of Alice’s local measurement by measuring his part
of the entangled pair, spatially distant from Alice.
III. OPTICAL NOISE
The above discussion of the commitment mechanism,
based on quantum complementarity, was done for the
ideal case of noiseless channels and perfect sources and
measurements [49]. In particular, the expressions (4) and
(5) for conditional probabilities are obtained under this
assumption. In this and the following section, we will dis-
cuss the case of a noisy environment. Regarding a future
implementation of the protocol, in which the qubit states
are encoded into the polarization of single photons [22–
25], we will discuss the case of optical realizations of the
protocol. Nevertheless, our theoretical approach could be
easily applied, with suitable small modifications, to other
types of physical realizations as well. First, we will con-
sider optical noise, while in the next section we will dis-
cuss non-optical effects, such as imperfect single-photon
sources, losses during the transmission and imperfect de-
tectors (detector efficiency and dark counts).
Note that in this protocol, unlike the case of quan-
tum cryptography, we are interested in more than just
one quantity. Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), used to
study the effects of noise in quantum cryptography (see
equations (31)-(33) in [26], page 166), is the ratio be-
tween the wrongly measured versus the total number of
qubits received, in case we measure in the same basis in
which the qubits were prepared. In our case, though, we
are interested in the ratios, i.e. the (conditional) prob-
abilities of both the case of measurement in the same
basis, and the case of measurement in a basis different
from that in which the qubits were prepared. In the ideal
case, the conditional probabilities were given by the ex-
pressions (4) and (5). In the following, we will present
the corresponding conditional probabilities for the cases
of depolarizing channel, bit-flip and phase-flip channels,
and arbitrary unitary evolution. At the end of this sec-
tion, we will combine the four contributions into a single
one.
A. Depolarizing channel
The depolarizing channel is a model of white noise:
with probability (1−p), the state of a system (in our case
qubit) stays the same, while with probability p it becomes
totally mixed. Note that in this case, the probability
to obtain the result corresponding to the initial state is
higher than (1 − p): even if, after passing the channel,
the state of the system turns out to be totally mixed
(which happens with probability p), there is still non-
zero probability to obtain the result corresponding to the
initial state. In this case, the probability to obtain the
“wrong” (e.g. opposite) result, when measuring in the
same basis in which the qubits were prepared is:
p0(1|0) = p1(0|1) = p/2. (7)
This is nothing but the optical part of the QBER, given
by equation (34) from [26]: QBERopt = (1-V)/2. Us-
ing this formula, where V is the “visibility” parameter,
we get that V = (1 − p), which is precisely the proba-
bility that the state will pass the channel intact - hence
the name “visibility” (a synonym, in a sense, of “trans-
parency”).
5The depolarizing channel has no preferred axis of ac-
tion, in the sense that its action is the same in each
basis of the systems’s Hilbert space. The noise is the
same along each axis, and is the most dominant type of
noise/errors that occur, as it is a model of white noise.
The Kraus decomposition (or the so-called operator-sum
representation; see [27], page 360, Section 8.2.3) of the
(super-)operator representing the depolarizing channel is,
for the case of qubit states, given by:
Ed(ρˆ) = (1− p)ρˆ+ p Iˆ
2
= (1− 3
4
)ρˆ+
p
4
3∑
i=1
σˆiρˆσˆi , (8)
where ρˆ is a general mixed state representing the initial
qubit state, Iˆ is the identity operator, and σˆi are the
standard Pauli operators. Note that the first equality is
the general definition, while the second one is a particular
expression for a two-dimensional qubit case.
Using the above definition (8), one obtains the rele-
vant conditional probabilities, analogous to (4) and (5)
obtained for the ideal case (η = QBER represents the
optical part of the quantum bit error rate):
• Alice measures Cˆ0:
p0(0|0) = 1− p
2
= 1− η
p0(1|0) = p
2
= η
p0(0|1) = (1− p) cos2 θ + p
2
= (1− 2η) cos2 θ + η
p0(1|1) = (1− p) sin2 θ + p
2
= (1− 2η) sin2 θ + η .
(9)
• Alice measures Cˆ1:
p1(0|0) = (1− p) sin2 θ + p
2
= (1− 2η) sin2 θ + η
p1(1|0) = (1− p) cos2 θ + p
2
= (1− 2η) cos2 θ + η
p1(0|1) = p
2
= η
p1(1|1) = 1− p
2
= 1− η .
(10)
B. Bit-flip channel
The other two types of channels, bit- and phase-flip,
are basis dependent. This means that, in the case of a
bit-flip in the B0 basis, it flips (changes) the state |0〉
into |0⊥〉 (and vice-versa) with probability p, where, by
construction 〈0|0⊥〉 = 0. But, if the state is a general
superposition a|0〉+b|0⊥〉, the flipped state, b|0〉+a|0⊥〉,
will not in general be orthogonal to the initial state
a|0〉 + b|0⊥〉, so it will not be a bit-flip in other bases.
Therefore, such noise/errors are expected to occur in
cases where we can isolate a preferable axis (and thus
a basis), which is the case of a measurement of an ob-
servable (or a preparation of a certain state, which is a
basis state of a certain observable). The operator-sum
representation of the bit-flip channel is:
Eb0(ρˆ) = (1− p)ρˆ+ pσˆx0 ρˆσˆx0 . (11)
For simplicity we will not present the relevant condi-
tional probabilities here, since they can be easily derived
from the general formula (15) for combined noises, given
in Subsection III E.
Note that the above channel flips the basis states |0〉
into |0⊥〉 (and vice-versa), such that the matrix represen-
tation of the operator σˆx0 in the basis B0 = {|0〉, |0⊥〉} is
the Pauli matrix σx = [σˆx0 ]B0 =
[
0 1
1 0
]
. We could also
consider a bit-flip channel where states |1〉 and |1⊥〉 are
flipped, using σˆx1 = |1〉〈1⊥|+ |1⊥〉〈1| instead of σˆx0 .
C. Phase-flip channel
The second basis-dependent operation to model the
noise is the phase-flip channel. It “flips” the phase of one
of the two basis vectors. Below, as in the previous case,
we fix the basis B0 and represent the flip of the phase
of |0⊥〉 by the operator σˆz0 whose matrix representation
is again a Pauli matrix σz = [σˆz0 ]B0 =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
. The
operator-sum representation of the phase-flip channel is:
Ep0(ρˆ) = (1− p)ρˆ+ pσˆz0 ρˆσˆz0 . (12)
Again, the relevant conditional probabilities are shown
in (15). In analogy with the bit-flip channel, here as well
we could consider a channel Ep1 given by the operator
σˆz1 = |1〉〈1| − |1⊥〉〈1⊥|.
D. Unitary evolution
Finally, the unitary evolution could be used to model
the cases for which we have a constant “rotation” of the
state of a system. For example, we may send qubits
as photons through an optical fibre which, due to bad
twisting, rotates the polarization angle by a fixed ratio
per unit length [28]. The unitary evolution is given by:
Eu(ρˆ) = Uˆ ρˆUˆ† , (13)
where the arbitrary U(1) unitary operator is, up to an
irrelevant global phase, given by its matrix representation
(say, in the B0 basis):
[Uˆ ]B0 =
[
eiλ cosα −e−iµ sinα
eiµ sinα e−iλ cosα
]
(14)
with α ∈ [0, pi/2] and λ, µ ∈ [0, 2pi) [29]. Note that
sin2 α = η is the QBER in the B0 basis.
The relevant conditional probabilities are given in (15).
6E. Total optical noise accumulated during the
emission, transmission and measurement
The next, and final, step in modeling the optical part
of the noise is combining the above four contributions in
a single set of formulas for conditional probabilities. Our
approach is the following. The whole apparatus consists
of three parts: the Sender (Bob) performing the state
preparation using the source of photons, the transmission
environment (transmission through the space, optical fi-
bre, etc.), and the receiver (Alice) performing the mea-
surement using essentially detectors and beam-splitters.
In each of the three parts, we can have some of the
above described types of noise. The white noise oc-
curs with particular probabilities ppd, p
t
d and p
m
d (p, t
and m stand for preparation, transmission and measure-
ment, and d for depolarizing channel), characteristic to
the equipment and the environment.
The white noise is a generic type of noise that af-
fects all types of instruments and environments. Dur-
ing the preparation and the measurement, we can also
have basis-dependent noises: when preparing the |0〉
state, we can have a bit-flip and a phase-flip in the basis
B0 = {|0〉, |0⊥〉}, characteristic for this particular prepa-
ration procedure. They occur with the corresponding
probabilities pb and pp (b and p standing for the bit and
phase, respectively; the upper labels are omitted for sim-
plicity). When preparing the |1〉 state, bit- and phase-
flips occur in the basis B1 = {|1〉, |1⊥〉}, with the same
probabilities pb and pp as in the previous case, since the
two-state preparation apparatuses are rotated with re-
spect to each other (assuming spatial isotropy). In gen-
eral, bit- and phase-flips could occur along a general axis
during the transmission as well, but this is a highly un-
likely scenario as usually the transmission environment
(space, optical fibre) has no preferential axes (bases) and
thus the noise is not likely to be biased in this man-
ner. Finally, a unitary evolution could occur during the
transmission, while it is unlikely to happen in sources
and detectors, and is thus ignored in the preparation and
measurement phases.
Therefore, the overall state of a qubit after “passing
through” the preparation apparatus, transmission envi-
ronment, and the measurement apparatus, just before
the detection, can be obtained by the consecutive appli-
cation of the following channels:
• depolarizing, bit-flip and phase-flip channels, each
with different probabilities (ppd, p
p
b , p
p
p), in the
preparation apparatus,
• depolarizing channel, with probability ptd, and uni-
tary rotation, during the transmission, and
• depolarizing, bit-flip and phase-flip channels, each
with different probabilities (pmd , p
m
b , p
m
p ), during the
measurements.
In each part of the apparatus (sender, transmission en-
vironment and receiver) different channels model differ-
ent noises that occur at the same time, which is assured
by their commutativity. Indeed, all the commutation re-
lations needed are satisfied: depolarizing, bit- and phase-
flips channels commute with each other (a consequence
of commutation relations for the Pauli matrices and the
particular Kraus representations of the three channels in
terms of Pauli matrices, see [27], for example). Thus,
the order of their application during the preparation and
measurement are irrelevant. In particular, we can apply
the depolarizing channel occurring during the prepara-
tion just before the transmission, and the one occurring
during the measurement just after the transmission. De-
polarizing channel and unitary evolution commute as well
(the white noise is isotropic), so that we can treat the
white noise by only one parameter: since Ed = Emd ◦Etd◦Epd ,
we have pd = p
m
d + p
t
d + p
p
d. On the other hand, the bit-
and phase-flips do not commute with the unitary evolu-
tion (as no axis-dependent operation commutes with the
unitary evolution, in general).
Combining the overall noise in the apparatus, depend-
ing on the preparation procedure (preparing either |0〉 of
the B0 basis, or |1〉 of the B1 basis), we have four distinct
channels:
• E00 = Emb0 ◦ Emp0 ◦ Ed ◦ Etu ◦ Epb0 ◦ Epp0 , when measuring
Cˆ0 and preparing |0〉,
• E01 = Emb0 ◦ Emp0 ◦ Ed ◦ Etu ◦ Epb1 ◦ Epp1 , when measuring
Cˆ0 and preparing |1〉,
• E10 = Emb1 ◦ Emp1 ◦ Ed ◦ Etu ◦ Epb0 ◦ Epp0 , when measuring
Cˆ1 and preparing |0〉,
• E11 = Emb1 ◦ Emp1 ◦ Ed ◦ Etu ◦ Epb1 ◦ Epp1 , when measuring
Cˆ1 and preparing |1〉.
The calculation of the corresponding conditional prob-
abilities is rather lengthy, but quite straightforward. We
present the final expressions for the conditional probabil-
ities when Alice measures Cˆ0:
7p0(0|0) = 1
2
[
1 + (1− pd)(1− 2pmb )(1− 2ppb) cos 2α
]
,
p0(1|0) = 1
2
[
1− (1− pd)(1− 2pmb )(1− 2ppb) cos 2α
]
.
p0(0|1) = 1
2
[1 + (1− pd)(1− 2pmb )(1− 2ppb) cos 2α cos 2θ − (1− pd)(1− 2pmb )(1− 2ppb) sin 2α sin 2θ cos(φ− λ− µ)] ,
p0(1|1) = 1
2
[
1− (1− pd)(1− 2pmb )(1− 2ppb) cos 2α cos 2θ + (1− pd)(1− 2pmb )(1− 2ppb) sin 2α sin 2θ cos(φ− λ− µ)
]
.
(15)
The results for the case when Alice measures Cˆ1 can
be obtained from the above ones by exchanging labels
0s with 1s in the conditional probabilities, for exam-
ple p0(1|0) = p1(0|1), etc. Note that the depolarizing
and bit-flip coefficients occur in the same way in all
expressions, as (1 − pd)(1 − 2pmb )(1 − 2ppb). Moreover,
the effects of both bit-flips (during the state prepara-
tion and during the measurement) have the same form
as that of a depolarizing channel. Indeed, by introducing
b = 1−(1−2pmb )(1−2ppb), we obtain the joint depolarizing
– bit-flip coefficient in a symmetric form (1− pd)(1− b).
Note that, since p
p/m
b ∈ [0, 1/2], we have b ∈ [0, 1]; the
ranges of the two coefficients coincide.
F. Distinguishability between conditional
probabilities corresponding to different commitment
choices
Each discrete probability distribution p(i), with i =
1, . . . n, can be seen as a vector p = (p1, p2, . . . pn),
whose coordinates pi are the probabilities, pi = p(i).
Yet, there is a more suitable representation as a vector
p = (p1, p2, . . . pn), where the coordinates pi are square
roots of the probabilities, pi =
√
p(i). The motivation
for this representation is the following: with the stan-
dard scalar product, p · q = (p, q) = 〈p|q〉 = ∑i piqi =∑
i
√
p(i)q(i), all vectors representing probability distri-
butions have unit norm, due to the normalization of prob-
abilities to one. On the other hand, a way to quantify
distinguishability between two probability distributions
p and q is given by the fidelity F (p, q) ≡ ∑i√p(i)q(i)
(known also as the Bhattacharyya coefficient [30]), which
is nothing but the scalar product we just introduced,
p · q = ∑i√p(i)q(i) = F (p, q). The more similar the
two probabilities are, the bigger the scalar product is (1
when they are identical); the more different, i.e. distin-
guishable, they are, the smaller the scalar product is (the
most distingushable being the orthogonal ones).
We can use this measure of the probability distin-
guishability to study the influence of noise to the proto-
col’s performance. In this and the following sections, we
will not consider the effects of a possible unitary rotation
during the transmission, as it represents a systematic er-
ror that can be compensated. Nevertheless, we hope the
above results on the conditional probabilities with the
influence of a possible unitary rotation could be useful in
detecting and eliminating such a systematic error.
When measuring Cˆ0, we get two probability distribu-
tions, each conditioned by the input state |0〉 or |1〉: one
is p0(∗|0) = (
√
p0(0|0),
√
p0(1|0)), the other p0(∗|1) =
(
√
p0(0|1),
√
p0(1|1)).
When measuring Cˆ1, we get other two probability dis-
tributions, again each conditioned by the input state |0〉
or |1〉: one is p1(∗|0) = (
√
p1(0|0),
√
p1(1|0)), the other
p1(∗|1) = (
√
p1(0|1),
√
p1(1|1)).
The stronger the noise is, the more the resulting condi-
tional probabilities diverge form the ideal case, given by
(4) and (5), approaching to a pair of totally balanced con-
ditional probabilities. Thus, we may consider the average
fidelity between the corresponding probability distribu-
tions for the noiseless case and the case of a noise given
by the channel E . If pc(r|b) and pEc (r|b) are the probabil-
ities for the ideal noiseless case and the case with a noise
given by the channel E , respectively (c, r, b ∈ {0, 1}), then
the average fidelity between the four probability distri-
butions is
〈F (E)〉 = 1
4
[
F
(
E ; Cˆ0, |0〉
)
+ F
(
E ; Cˆ0, |1〉
)
+
F
(
E ; Cˆ1, |0〉
)
+ F
(
E ; Cˆ1, |1〉
)]
,
(16)
where the four fidelities between the four pairs of prob-
ability distributions, each obtained for the case of Alice
measuring Cˆc, when the state sent by Bob was |b〉 are:
8F
(
E ; Cˆ0, |0〉
)
= F
(
p0(∗|0), pE0 (∗|0)
)
=
(√
p0(0|0)pE0 (0|0) +
√
p0(1|0)pE0 (1|0)
)
,
F
(
E ; Cˆ0, |1〉
)
= F
(
p0(∗|1), pE0 (∗|1)
)
=
(√
p0(0|1)pE0 (0|1) +
√
p0(1|1)pE0 (1|1)
)
,
F
(
E ; Cˆ1, |0〉
)
= F
(
p1(∗|0), pE1 (∗|0)
)
=
(√
p1(0|0)pE1 (0|0) +
√
p1(1|0)pE1 (1|0)
)
,
F
(
E ; Cˆ1, |1〉
)
= F
(
p1(∗|1), pE1 (∗|1)
)
=
(√
p1(0|1)pE1 (0|1) +
√
p1(1|1)pE1 (1|1)
)
.
(17)
The bigger the above expected fidelity is (the more sim-
ilar the actual probability distributions are to the ideal
noiseless ones), the higher is the protocol’s security.
One could also analyze the intrinsic properties of the
conditional probabilities pEc (∗|b), obtained when a noise
E is present (for simplicity, when considering the intrin-
sic properties of distributions in noisy environments, we
drop the superscript E). As mentioned before, when
presenting the protocol, each choice of Alice’s measure-
ment can serve to infer the qubit state, prepared by Bob.
Thus, whatever the observable Cˆc she measures, the cor-
responding distributions obtained for the case when the
prepared state is |0〉, and when it is |1〉, should be as
distinguishable as possible. The fidelities between these
two pairs of probability distributions are:
F (p0(∗|0), p0(∗|1)) =
√
p0(0|0)p0(0|1) +
√
p0(1|0)p0(1|1) ,
F (p1(∗|0), p1(∗|1)) =
√
p1(0|0)p0(0|1) +
√
p1(1|0)p0(1|1) .
(18)
The average fidelity between the probability distributions
obtained when sending the state |0〉 and the state |1〉 is
then:
〈F (|0〉, |1〉)〉 = 1/2 [F (p0(∗|0), p0(∗|1)) +
F (p1(∗|0), p1(∗|1))] . (19)
The smaller this average fidelity is, the more distinguish-
able the two distributions are, thus the better can Alice
infer which state was sent by Bob, and the protocol se-
curity is better.
Finally, note that Alice’s choice of measurement must
produce two rather different conditional probability dis-
tributions p0(∗|b) and p1(∗|b). Only then can her com-
mitment be imprinted in the set of her measurement out-
comes, so that Bob can learn Alice’s commitment dur-
ing the opening phase, and Alice cannot change decision
(the protocol is binding). The average fidelity between
the two sets of probability distributions, obtained when
measuring Cˆ0, and Cˆ1, respectively, is:
〈F (Cˆ0, Cˆ1)〉 = 1/2 [F (p0(∗|0), p1(∗|0)) +
F (p0(∗|1), p1(∗|1))] ,
(20)
where:
F (p0(∗|0), p1(∗|0)) =
√
p0(0|0)p1(0|0) +
√
p0(1|0)p1(1|0) ,
F (p0(∗|1), p1(∗|1)) =
√
p0(0|1)p1(0|1) +
√
p0(1|1)p1(1|1) .
(21)
Again, the smaller this expected fidelity is, the more dis-
tinguishable the two distributions are, which results in
higher security of the protocol: the more distingushable
are the actions of Alice, the more secure is her commit-
ment (the choice of her action).
Note that in the noiseless case, we have that
〈F (|0〉, |1〉)〉 = cos2 θ, while 〈F (Cˆ0, Cˆ1)〉 = sin2 θ. Thus,
according to the first criterion, the best state distin-
guishability is, as expected, achieved for θ = pi/2, while
the highest measurement distinguishability is achieved
for θ = 0 (again, this is a rather trivial fact when Bob
sends qubits in only one state, which corresponds to re-
sult 0 when measuring Cˆ0 and 1 when measuring Cˆ1 –
the two observables represent the same physical prop-
erty, with its outcomes being re-labelled). The two op-
posed security requirements become equal for θ = pi/4,
which matches the optimal value for the angle between
the states sent by Bob.
The same happens for noisy channels. In particu-
lar, in Fig. 1(a) is plotted the graph of |〈F (|0〉, |1〉)〉 −
〈F (Cˆ0, Cˆ1)〉|, as a function of θ and pd in the case of a
depolarizing channel. As shown, the optimal choice of θ
is θ = pi/4, unless pd = 1, in which case the measure-
ment results are completely random, and consequently
any θ will yield the same behavior. An analogous phe-
nomenon occurs in the bit-flip and the phase-flip chan-
nels (see Fig. 1), in which cases complete randomness is
achieved by setting pb = 1/2 and pp = 1/2, respectively
(note that on this plot we extended the domain of the
bit-flip coefficient to [0, 1] obtaining the plot symmetric
around the value pb = 1/2).
Next we present the effects of noise on the average fi-
delity 〈F (E)〉 between noisy and noiseless channels (16)
- see Fig. 2(a) - and within the noisy channel itself,
〈F (|0〉, |1〉)〉 and 〈F (Cˆ0, Cˆ1)〉, given by (19) and (20), re-
spectively, for the optimal choice of θ = pi/4 (recall that
in this case the two are equal) - see Fig. 2(b). In the
plots, as noted in the previous section, the coefficient b
stands for 1−(1−2ppb)(1−2pmb ), and represents the joint
effect of the bit-flip channels in the preparation and mea-
surement apparatuses. Both figures show the expected
behavior. Adding noise gradually takes the probability
distributions from a noiseless case to a completely ran-
dom case. Also note that the effect of the bit-flip channel
is the same as the effect of the depolarizing channel.
The other quantity widely used to measure how dif-
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Fidelity 〈F (E)〉 between noisy and noiseless channels (a), and Fidelity 〈F (|0〉, |1〉)〉 = 〈F (Cˆ0, Cˆ1)〉 within
the noisy channel (b), as functions of the depolarizing coefficient pd and the joint (preparation- and measurement-induced)
bit-flip coefficient b = 1− (1− 2ppb)(1− 2pmb ).
ferent probability distributions are is the relative entropy
(also known as Kullback-Leibler divergence [31]; for a re-
view of the use of relative entropy in the field of quantum
information, see [32]). For two probability distributions
{pi} and {qi}, the relative entropy between the two is
given by:
S(p||q) =
∑
i
pi ln
pi
qi
. (22)
Although not formally a distance – it is not symmet-
ric with respect to its arguments – it still can serve as
a measure of distinguishability [50]. It determines the
probability that a random source that emits symbols ac-
cording to a probability distribution {qi} will produce
a sequence of symbols consistent with a source emitting
according to {pi} (see Theorem 4 from [32]).
Here as well we can consider the quantities analogous
to those considered in the case of the fidelity, 〈S(E)〉,
〈S(|0〉|||1〉)〉 and 〈S(Cˆ0||Cˆ1)〉, given by expressions anal-
ogous to (16), (19) and (20). Note that, since relative
entropy is not symmetric, we can consider six rather than
just three quantities. In the case of 〈S(E)〉 though, only
one of the two options is relevant to our study: that which
quantifies the probability that the noisy environment and
imperfect apparatus will reproduce results as in the ideal
case given by (4) and (5). We also note that in the noise-
less case the state and measurement distinguishabilities,
according to relative entropy, become equal for the opti-
mal value θ = pi/4. The qualitative results for the relative
entropy mimic entirely those for the fidelity, and we will
thus skip presenting them.
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IV. OPTIMAL CHEATING STRATEGY FOR
ALICE
In this section, we discuss the optimal cheating strat-
egy for Alice, in case she is allowed to perform only single-
qubit measurements. In particular, we analyze the effects
of noise on the protocol’s security in cases when Alice
attempts to cheat. Although the requirement of single-
qubit measurements might in general pose a significant
constraint, for our practical quantum bit commitment
scheme it is rather natural. Namely, not only that using
today’s technology it is not possible to reliably perform
large multi-qubit coherent measurements, but in our case
Alice would need to have some kind of a stable quantum
memory, since Bob sends his qubits sequentially, and at
times randomly chosen by him – precisely the equipment
that is not available today and that makes our (practical)
commitment scheme possible.
The goal of a cheating Alice is to break one of the two
protocol’s security requirements: the binding feature. Al-
ice would like to be able to postpone the moment of her
commitment, ideally until the opening phase. In order to
do that, she has to be able to pass both tests of commit-
ting to 0 and to 1, and since she is, by the constraints of
today’s technology, forced to perform her measurements
immediately upon receiving the qubits from Bob (dur-
ing the commitment phase), the only option left is to
choose a measurement that would provide her with the
best possible inference of qubit states sent by Bob. In
other words, the optimal measurement has to secure min-
imal error when discriminating between the two quantum
states. This is a well known problem of ambiguous quan-
tum state discrimination, and the minimal probability
of error when discriminating between two general mixed
quantum states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 is given by the famous Hel-
strom bound [33]:
Pe(ρˆ0, ρˆ1) =
1
2
+
1
2
Tr|p0ρˆ0 − p1ρˆ1|, (23)
where p0 and p1 = (1 − p0) are the probabilities of
having the state ρˆ0 and ρˆ1, respectively (in our case,
p0 = p1 = 1/2). In the case of pure states and equal a pri-
ori probabilities, the Helstrom bound is Pe = (1−sin θ)/2
and the optimal observable is given by the orthogonal ba-
sis vectors |0˜〉 and |1˜〉, such that (see for example [35]):
|0〉 = cosα|0˜〉+ sinα|1˜〉
|1〉 = cosβ|0˜〉+ sinβ|1˜〉 , (24)
where α = pi/4−θ/2 and β = pi/4−θ/2. In other words,
the basis vectors |0˜〉 and |1˜〉 are in the plane defined by
|0〉 and |1〉, and share the same bisector with them.
For the value of θ = pi/4, when the protocol’s security
is maximal, the optimal observable for a cheating Alice
is given by the so-called Breidbart basis [36]:
|0˜〉 = cos(pi/8)|0〉 − sin(pi/8)|1〉
|1˜〉 = sin(pi/8)|0〉+ cos(pi/8)|1〉 . (25)
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Fidelity 〈F (E)〉 (dashed, in blue) and
relative entropy 〈S(E)〉 (full, in red) between a honest strat-
egy without the presence of noise, and the optimal cheating
strategy in the presence of white noise, as a function of the
noise parameter pd.
In order to analyze quantitatively the effects of noise
on the above cheating strategy, we compare, in analogy
with the previous section, how similar various probability
distributions are, using the fidelity and relative entropy
as distinguishability measures. In particular, we can con-
sider how different the conditional probabilities obtained
by a cheating Alice are from those obtained by the hon-
est one. For simplicity, we start by comparing the results
obtained by a cheating party, in the presence of noise,
with the results of an honest agent, in the ideal noise-
less case (4), (5). We will consider the average fidelity
〈F (E)〉, given by equations (16) and (17), where in (17)
instead of pE0 (∗|∗) and pE1 (∗|∗), we have the unique cheat-
ing probability pEch(∗|∗). Analogously, we consider the
relative entropy 〈S(E)〉. The results for the fidelity and
relative entropy are given on Fig. 3, respectively (note
that in the rest of this section we consider the optimal
choice of θ = pi/4). We observe the qualitative differ-
ence between the behavior of the fidelity and the relative
entropy: indeed, one can easily see that the entropy de-
creases slightly with the introduction of small noises (in
fact, the optimal value of added noise is rather signif-
icant, being slightly over 0.29). This behavior can be
taken advantage of in the more realistic situation of both
parties being subjected to noise. In fact, as Fig. 4 shows,
independently of the channel’s noise factor pd, it is al-
ways advantageous for a dishonest party to introduce a
small extra noise factor ∆pd, as it decreases the relative
entropy between the underlying probability distributions
(note that ∆pd ≤ 1− pd). One can easily prove that the
optimal amount of noise ∆p˜d a cheating party should
introduce is:
∆p˜d =
(
1− 1√
2
)
(1− pd) . (26)
The above comparative study of the two distinguisha-
bility measures shows two rather conflicting results:
while according to the fidelity, noise degrades the chances
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Introducing a small noise ∆pd helps a
dishonest party.
of a cheating party, according to the relative entropy, it
is always advantageous to add a little noise in order to
increase the chances of a cheating party to go on un-
noticed. Unlike the fidelity, the relative entropy gives
the probability that a cheating strategy will produce the
distribution of measurement results consistent with that
produced by an honest party.
It is interesting to analyze the reasons for such be-
havior of the relative entropy, and why is it not present
in the case of the fidelity. For simplicity, we will ana-
lyze only the case when an honest strategy is executed in
noiseless circumstances, the general case of both honest
and cheating agents are subjected to noise is straightfor-
ward. First, we note that unlike the standard quantum
cryptographic protocols, such as BB84 [4] and B92 [11],
where the only relevant results are those obtained for the
cases when the basis of the states sent by Bob and of
the observable measured by Alice coincide, here we are
interested in the results when the two are not the same.
In other words, we are not only interested in how similar
the pairs
(
p0(∗|0), pEch(∗|0)
)
and
(
p1(∗|1), pEch(∗|1)
)
are,
but also in the distinguishability of the cross terms given
by the pairs
(
p0(∗|1), pEch(∗|1)
)
and
(
p1(∗|0), pEch(∗|1)
)
of
the probability distributions of the measurement results.
And it is precisely the cross terms that make a differ-
ence: the honest party probability distributions p0(∗|1)
and p1(∗|0) are equal and are actually a uniformly ran-
dom distribution, while the cheating probability distri-
butions pEch(∗|0) and pEch(∗|1) are biased, and approach a
uniformly random distribution when the noise increases.
This means that both the fidelity increase, and the rel-
ative entropy decrease, will occur between the pairs of
the cross terms for certain range of the noise parameter
pd. Nevertheless, these contributions will affect differ-
ently the overall average fidelity 〈F (E)〉 and the average
relative entropy 〈S(E)〉: the former will always decrease
with pd, while the latter will experience a decrease for
a rather broad range of values of pd. Mathematically,
this is just an effect of scaling: fidelity uses a linear scale,
and the cross terms are not powerful enough to overcome
the behavior of non-cross terms, whereas the relative en-
tropy uses a logarithmic scale, and allows the cross terms
to express themselves better.
V. THE SECURITY OF THE PROTOCOL - A
MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS
In Section II we presented a general description of
Bob’s decision process: in order to accept Alice’s commit-
ment to, say, value 0, the probability that the statistics q,
formed by the data communicated by Alice, was obtained
by measuring Cˆ0 must be bigger than a certain thresh-
old value α. In addition to that, the probability that the
statistics q, which passed Bob’s test of committing to 0,
was obtained by measuring Cˆ1 should be smaller than
β (the protocol is viable). After analyzing the effects
of noise and imperfect photon sources and measurement
apparatuses, as well as Alice’s optimal cheating strategy,
we can study in more detail Bob’s criteria for deciding
if the results obtained from Alice confirm that she com-
mitted to 0, or to 1, or that the results show that she
tried to cheat. We can also check the minimum number
of photons that need to be measured by Alice for Bob’s
decisions not to be compromised by Alice’s eventual at-
tempt to cheat.
For simplicity, we will analyze the criterion for deciding
if given measurement results confirm that Alice commit-
ted to 0. The total number of measurement outcomes is
n = n(0) + n(1), where n(0) is the number of measure-
ments on photons sent in the state |0〉, and analogously
for n(1). Furthermore, n(0|0) is the number of outcomes
0, when the state |0〉 is sent, while n(1|0) is the number
of outcomes 1 (and analogously for n(∗|1)). This way, we
have two (conditional) probability distributions:
q(∗|0) = {q(0|0) = n(0|0)
n(0)
, q(1|0) = n(1|0)
n(0)
},
q(∗|1) = {q(0|1) = n(0|1)
n(1)
, q(1|1) = n(1|1)
n(1)
}.
(27)
To analyze the protocol’s security against Alice’s at-
tempt to cheat, we introduce the similar criterion to the
one given by (6):
P (q||p0) > α⇒ P (q||pch) < β. (28)
Note that it is more likely to produce statistics that look
as if being obtained by committing to 0 by measuring Cˆch
than by measuring Cˆ1. Therefore, we will only consider
the criterion that the statistics q = {q(∗|0), q(∗|1)} were
obtained by measuring Cˆ0, and not by measuring Cˆch.
Thus, if statistics q pass Bob’s test of committing to 0,
P (q(∗|0)||p0(∗|0)) > α and P (q(∗|1)||p0(∗|1)) > α′,
(29)
then for the protocol to be secure (and consequently vi-
able) we require that:
P (q(∗|0)||pch(∗|0)) < β and P (q(∗|1)||pch(∗|1)) < β′.
(30)
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FIG. 5. (Color online) P (q(∗|1)||p0(∗|1)) – left bump – and P (q(∗|1)||pch(∗|1)) – right bump, as functions of a depolarizing
coefficient pd and q0 =
n(0|1)
n(0)
, for n(0) = 50. The green (left) full line represents the intersection between the left bump and the
q0 = µ0 + 2σ0 plane, while the yellow (right) one represents the intersection between the right bump and the q0 = µch − 2σch
plane, both as functions of pd.
(Note that, in general, the thresholds α and α′, as well
as β and β′ need not be equal.)
The above probabilities are given by a simple Bino-
mial distribution [51] B(n0;n, p0) (for simplicity, here we
define n = n(0), n0 = n(0|1) and p0 = p0(0|1)):
P (q(∗|1)||p0(∗|1)) =
(
n
n0
)
pn00 (1− p0)(n−n0) , (31)
and analogously for other cases. For all practical pur-
poses the above Binomial distribution will behave as a
Normal distribution N (x;µ0, σ0), with its mean µ0 and
standard deviation σ0. Thus, we can set parameter α to
be α2σ = Φ(µ0+2σ0;µ0, σ0), where Φ(x;µ0, σ0) is the cu-
mulative distribution function of the normal distribution
N (x;µ0, σ0). For such α the statistics obtained by mea-
suring Cˆ0 will pass the test of committing to 0 in about
97.7% of the cases. Analogously, the distribution defin-
ing the second probability in (30) is given by µch and σch,
and we can define β to be β2σ = Φ(µch − 2σch;µch, σch),
for which the statistics obtained by measuring Cˆch will
lead to a successful cheat in only 2.3% of the cases.
It turns out that the second conditions in both (29)
and (30) are, albeit qualitatively the same, quantita-
tively stronger than the first pair of conditions. In
Fig. 5 we plot P (q(∗|1)||p0(∗|1)) – left bump – and
P (q(∗|1)||pch(∗|1)) – right bump, as functions of a depo-
larizing coefficient pd and q0 =
n(0|1)
n(0) , for n(0) = 50 (i.e.
the total number of measurements is about n = 100).
The second condition in (30) now translates to
µ0 + 2σ0 ≤ µch − 2σch. (32)
α β p∗d
α2σ = 97.7% β2σ = 2.3% 0.26
α3σ = 99.86% βσ = 15.8% 0.23
α3σ = 99.86% β2σ = 2.3% 0.09
α2σ = 97.7% βσ = 15.8% 0.42
TABLE I. Maximum value of pd as a function of the security
parameters α and β.
The latter is satisfied as long as the depolarizing coeffi-
cient pd is smaller than about 26%, which is represented
by the intersection of the two full lines in Fig. 5.
We see that already for n = 100 we obtain statis-
tics such that the probability to cheat becomes negligible
for realistic amounts of noise. Note that this number is
smaller than the number of photons needed to be mea-
sured in standard quantum key distributions, where a
number of results are used not for establishing a secret
key, but “wasted” for checking if the communication be-
tween Alice and Bob was eavesdropped.
The conditions determining the probabilities α and β
in (30), given by (32), can be either strengthened or loos-
ened according to one’s needs. One can, for instance,
increase the viability of the protocol by setting α to be
α3σ = Φ(µ0 + 3σ0;µ0, σ0), in which case an honest party
would successfully pass Bob’s test in 99.86% of the cases.
On the other hand, one could decrease the security pa-
rameter β to βσ = Φ(µch − σch;µch, σch), which would
still allow Bob to spot cheating in about 84.2% of the
cases. In Table I, we present various possibilities for p∗d,
the maximum value of pd for which conditions (29) and
(30) are satisfied, as functions of the security parameters
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α and β (i.e., the conditions analogous to (32)).
VI. (IM)PERFECT NON-DEMOLITION
MEASUREMENTS AND NOISY/BOUNDED
MEMORY
In this section we analyze the protocol’s security under
the more realistic assumptions of using finite efficiency
non-demolition measurements and a noisy/bounded
memory.
First, we discuss the use of non-demolition measure-
ments. The ideal non-demolition photon measurement
would allow Alice to obtain the photon arrival times with-
out actually destroying them, thus permitting her to keep
the qubits in a (noisy) memory and postpone her com-
mitment. Typically, such non-demolition measurements
would alter the photon’s state of polarization, a contribu-
tion which is equivalent to one coming from an imperfect
memory and with which we’ll deal later on. In case of
a finite efficiency, say pnd < 1, a certain fraction of ar-
rived photons will not be possible to store. If Alice’s
equipment simply absorbs such photons, and does not
allow measuring the photon polarizations, Bob can de-
tect such cheating attempt by comparing the expected
and presented number of results (Bob knows the speci-
fications of the set-up, in particular the rate of photon
emission, the absorption coefficient of the environment,
and the detectors’ efficiencies, and can therefore estimate
the expected number n of results provided by Alice). In
case she has an apparatus that can measure the polar-
ization of the absorbed photons, Alice’s best strategy is
to perform the polarization measurement of the cheat-
ing observable Cˆch on the said fraction of (1 − pnd)n
photons. But this is equivalent to the case of perform-
ing an ideal non-demolition measurement, and having a
bounded noisy memory, such that only the fraction of
ν = pnd of results are obtained by the stored photons,
while the rest are obtained by measuring Cˆch. There-
fore, in the rest of the section we assume the ideal case
of pnd = 1.
Regarding quantum memories, we will first again dis-
cuss the best case scenario for a cheating Alice: unre-
stricted amount of noisy quantum storage. Storing qubits
in a memory for a certain “delay time” ∆t allows Alice
to postpone her commitment and thus break the bind-
ing security condition. Since the memory is not ideal,
during that time the photon’s polarization states will
further decohere with the environment, hence decreas-
ing Alice’s probability to pass Bob’s test (29). We model
the noise by a depolarizing quantum channel given by
pd(∆t). This way, when measuring, say Cˆ0, the cheat-
ing a priori conditional probability distributions p∆t0 (∗|∗),
given by pd + pd(∆t), will differ from those expected by
Bob, given by only pd. As in the previous section, the
threshold value for pd(∆t), for which cheating is not pos-
sible, is given by (Bob’s decision criterion)
P (q(∗|0)||p0(∗|0)) > α and P (q(∗|1)||p0(∗|1)) > α, (33)
α∆t β∆t p∗d(∆t)
α2σ = 97.7% β2σ = 2.3% 0.4
α3σ = 99.86% βσ = 15.8% 0.35
α3σ = 99.86% β2σ = 2.3% 0.49
α2σ = 97.7% βσ = 15.8% 0.26
TABLE II. Maximum value of pd(∆t) as a function of the
security parameters α and β.
and (security criterion)
P (q(∗|0)||p∆t0 (∗|0)) < β∆t and P (q(∗|1)||p∆t0 (∗|1)) < β∆t.
(34)
Note that α is given in terms of µ and σ of the “honest”
conditional probability distributions p0(∗|∗), while β∆t is
obtained for µ∆t and σ∆t of the “cheating” conditional
probability distributions p∆t0 (∗|∗).
Again, we analyze the case of committing to 0, and
for simplicity we choose only the q(∗|0) results. Fur-
ther, in analogy with the previous section, we (re)define
n = n(0), n0 = n(0|0), p0 = p0(0|0) and q(∗|0) = {q =
n0/n, 1 − q = (1 − n0)/n}. This change of notation
is due to the fact that p∆t0 (∗|1) = p0(∗|1) is uniformly
random, and independent of ∆t. In Fig. 6, we plot
P (q(∗|0)||p0(∗|0)) – right bump – and P (q(∗|0)||p∆t0 (∗|0))
– left bump, as functions of pd(∆t), for a fixed value of
pd = 0.15. For higher (lower) values of pd, the corre-
sponding plot is a simple translation to the left (right),
along with a rescaling.
Finding the threshold value p∗d(∆t) for pd(∆t) (i.e. for
how long can Alice postpone her commitment), as a func-
tion of pd, is now equivalent to solving
µ∆t0 + 2σ
∆t
0 ≤ µ0 − 2σ0, (35)
just as in the previous section (see Eq. (32)). Again, we
can vary the security parameters α∆t and β∆t. Various
possibilities are presented in Table II.
Finally, we briefly discuss the general case of bounded
and noisy quantum memories. Let ν be the fraction of
the total results n which were obtained by measuring the
photons stored in a noisy quantum memory. The optimal
strategy for a cheating Alice would then be to measure
Cˆ0 on νn photons, and the cheating observable Cˆch on
the rest of (1 − ν)n photons that she cannot store. Due
to the law of large numbers, the a priori probability of
such cheating strategy would be
p¯0(∗|0) = νp0(∗|0) + (1− ν)pch(∗|0), (36)
and analogously for p¯0(∗|0). The security criterion would
then be:
P (q(∗|0)||p¯0(∗|0)) < β¯ and P (q(∗|1)||p¯0(∗|1)) < β¯′, (37)
which can be easily analyzed using the previous results
regarding the cheating observable and the noisy memory.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) P (q(∗|0)||p0(∗|0)) – right bump – and P (q(∗|0)||p∆t0 (∗|0)) – left bump, as a function of pd(∆t) and
q0 =
n(0|1)
n(0)
, for a fixed value of pd = 0.15 and n(0) = 50. The green (right) full line represents the intersection between the
right bump and the q0 = µ0 − 2σ0 plane, while the yellow (left) one represents the intersection between the left bump and the
q0 = µ
∆t
0 + 2σ
∆t
0 plane, both as functions of pd(∆t).
VII. NON-OPTICAL DETECTOR ERRORS
In this section, we briefly discuss the effects of non-
optical errors, caused by the imperfect single photon
sources, transmission losses and imperfect detectors (fi-
nite efficiency and dark counts). As the causes of these
errors are basis-independent, they will manifest equally
as in the case of standard quantum cryptography, when
the state |b〉 sent by Bob and the observable Cˆc measured
by Alice coincide, c = b. In Appendix B, following [26],
page 166, we present the explicit expressions for non-
optical quantum bit corrections δpc(∗|b), for c = b, to
the total probabilities p˜c(∗|b) = pc(∗|b) + δpc(∗|b), where
pc(∗|b) represent optical contribution discussed in Section
III.
As in the case of calculating the non-optical part of
QBER, so in cases of measuring a “wrong” observable,
when c 6= b, we neglect all less probable cases and cal-
culate the error due to dark counts only when no pho-
tons arrived at the measuring apparatus (that consists,
among other things, of two detectors D0 and D1, corre-
sponding to two possible outcomes 0 and 1, respectively).
Therefore, we can safely estimate that the number of
dark counts in both detectors is equal. In the case of
|〈0|1〉| = cospi/4 = 1/√2, when the protocol’s security is
optimal, the error due to dark counts is thus zero.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a two-state practical quantum bit com-
mitment protocol. We discussed the effects of both opti-
cal and non-optical noise. In the latter case, we showed
that finite detector efficiency, dark counts, imperfect
single-photon sources and transmission losses have essen-
tially the same effects as in the case of standard quan-
tum cryptography. To quantitatively analyze the effects
of the optical part of the noise, we used the fidelity and
the relative entropy, two information-theoretic measures
of probability distribution distinguishability. As a corol-
lary to our study, using the two distinguishability mea-
sures only, we obtained the well-known result that the
optimal value of the angle θ between the two quantum
states used in the protocol is θ = pi/4. We also showed a
somewhat counter-intuitive result that adding a certain
amount of white noise can always help a cheating Alice
to postpone her commitment until the opening phase.
This effect is a result of the comparison of the results
of measurements in cases when the measurement basis
do not coincide with the basis from which the state is
sent. Although it can be seen by looking at the behav-
ior of both the fidelity and the relative entropy, when
averaging over all the possible cases, only the expected
relative entropy retains the signature of this effect. Fi-
nally, we analyzed the protocol’s security when Alice has
access to (im)perfect non-demolition measurements and
noisy/bounded memories, and showed that the protocol
is robust against such possible attacks.
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Appendix A
In this Appendix, we present a simple example of the
application of bit commitment to authentication proto-
cols based on zero-knowledge proof systems. Suppose
Alice wants to authenticate herself to Bob, by proving
to Bob that she knows a solution to a difficult mathe-
matical problem, without actually revealing the solution
(thus the name zero-knowledge proof). This requirement
is crucial: the knowledge Alice has is unique to her (the
problem is difficult, so others cannot solve it in real time),
and is used as a mean of identification. If she discloses
it to Bob, he can in the future falsely present himself as
Alice, which she would like to prevent.
Consider the following mathematical problem (the so-
called coloring problem): given a graph G = (V,E),
where V is the set of vertices and E ⊆ V × V the set
of edges, and three colors {R, Y,B} – red, yellow and
blue – find a coloring C : V → {R, Y,B}, such that no
two adjacent vertices have the same color, (u, v) ∈ E ⇒
C(u) 6= C(v). This is known to be a hard problem, in
fact it is an NP-complete problem (see for example [37],
page 1019): if only a graph is given, finding a proper col-
oring using today’s best algorithms requires exponential
time, with respect to the graphs’ complexity. Therefore,
it is for all practical purposes safe to assume that Alice
is the only person who knows a coloring, and therefore
she can use it as her personal identifier.
The way to prove to Bob that she indeed knows the
coloring C, without actually revealing this information,
is the following. The protocol is probabilistic, consisting
of n steps, such that the probability that Alice cheats
(convinces Bob she knows the coloring, without actually
knowing C) approaches to zero exponentially fast, with
respect to the number of steps n. Each step consists of
three consecutive parts:
1. Alice randomly chooses a permutation pi :
{R, Y,B} → {R, Y,B}, sets a new coloring C ′ =
pi ◦ C, and commits to it: writes down on a piece
of paper the colors, according to new coloring C ′, of
all the vertices of a (publicly known) graph G, locks
it in a secure “safe”, keeps the key with her, and
gives the “safe” to Bob. She can do so by commit-
ting to a string of 2N bits, where N is the number
of vertices of G: assuming Alice and Bob agreed
prior to the protocol on a particular enumeration
of the graph’s vertices, each i-th pair of bits, with
i = 1, . . . N , defines the color of the i-th vertex (ob-
viously, this is not an optimal encryption); this way,
each bit is locked in a different “safe”, for which a
different key is produced.
2. Bob chooses an edge (u.v) and challenges Alice to
show him their respective colors.
3. Alice opens the values of the bit pairs correspond-
ing to the vertex u and the vertex v (gives the keys
for the corresponding bits), thus disclosing to Bob
the colors C ′(u) and C ′(v). If they are the same,
Alice failed to pass the test and Bob terminates the
procedure. Otherwise, they repeat the procedure
until Bob is satisfied.
Obviously, Alice can pass the above test only if she indeed
knows the coloring C of the graph G. Otherwise, she can
only try to partially color the graph (properly, so that the
adjacent vertices have different colors), hoping that Bob
will not choose vertices that she colored with the same
color. If the probability to pass the test in a single step of
the protocol is p < 1, then the probability to pass the test
goes to zero exponentially fast with the number of steps
n of the protocol, as 1− pn. Note that although in each
step of the protocol Bob learns a coloring of one pair of
vertices, after n steps he still did not learn the coloring of
n vertices, as in each step Alice chooses different coloring
C ′ = pi ◦C, given by a permutation pi, unknown to Bob.
Note the essential importance that Alice’s commitment
is binding – otherwise, she could, upon learning Bob’s
choice of vertices u and v, change her commitment and
choose the two colors to be different. Also, it is important
that the protocol is concealing – otherwise, Bob would
be able to learn a coloring of graph G, and thus, in the
future, impersonate Alice.
This concept of a cryptographic commitment can be
traced back to the early 80’s, with the works of Shamir,
Rivest and Adleman [38], along with those of Blum [39]
and finally of Even [40] where the concept was first
named. Nowadays, it has found its way into several pro-
tocols of many diverse natures, such as e-voting proto-
cols [41], the TESLA authentication protocol [42], and
the Schnorr protocol [43] on which part of Microsoft’s
U-prove system is based [44].
Appendix B
In this Appendix, we evaluate the non-optical con-
tributions δpc(∗|b), for c = b. As noted when dis-
cussing the depolarizing channel, the two out of four
probabilities are nothing but the quantum bit error rate,
QBER = δp0(1|0) = δp1(0|1), while the other two are
then straightforward to obtain, δp0(0|0) = −δp0(1|0)
and δp1(1|1) = −δp1(0|1) (note that, by definition,
p˜0(0|0) + p˜0(1|0) = 1 and p0(0|0) + p0(1|0) = 1). For
example, let Alice measure Cˆ0. Then, we are interested
in cases when result 1 is obtained for qubits in state |0〉.
Let Ntot be the total number of qubits received in the
state |0〉, and let Nwrong be the number of qubits received
in the state |0〉 for which the wrong result 1 is obtained,
during the time interval T . Then, the QBER is given by:
QBER =
Nwrong
Ntot
=
Nwrong
T
Ntot
T
=
Rerror
Rtot
. (B1)
Here Rtot = Ntot/T and Rerror = Nwrong/T are the total
and the error rates, respectively, for the qubits received in
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the state |0〉. If Rraw is the overall source rate, including
both |0〉 and |1〉 states, then
Rtot =
1
2
Rraw, (B2)
since Bob sends on average equal number of |0〉 and |1〉
states. The total rate (number/time) of qubits sent in
either |0〉 or |1〉 state (given by frepµ), that were not
absorbed and that managed to arrive to detectors (given
by tlink) and were detected (given by η):
Rraw = frepµtlinkη . (B3)
Here, frep is the pulse rate (the number of “attempts” to
send a photon, per time), and µ is the mean number of
photons per pulse. Thus, frepµ is the number of photons
sent, in the unit of time. The probability that a sent
photon arrives to a detector is tlink ∼ 10−αL (α is the
absorption coefficient, and L is the transmission distance,
i.e. length of an optical cable). Finally, the detector
efficiency η is the probability that a photon that arrived
to a detector is actually detected. Note that µ ∼ 0.1 <<
1: we ignore the low probable cases of sending two or
more photons per pulse.
In general, Rerror = Ropt +Rdet, but here we are only
interested in the error arising due to dark counts. We
have
Rdet =
1
2
(
1
2
frep
)
(1− µtlinkη)pdark ≈ 1
4
freppdark . (B4)
Here, 12 is the probability that a wrong detector will click;
( 12frep) is the rate of photons sent in the “right” state (in
our case |0〉); (1−µtlinkη) is the probability that a photon
is not detected (when dark counts are relevant!). Note
that the probability that a photon arrives to detectors
and is efficiently detected is small, µtlinkη << 1. Also,
we neglect the less probable cases of “right” dark counts,
when a photon does not arrive to detectors.
Thus, we get:
δp0(1|0) = δp1(0|1) = pdark
2µtlinkη
δp0(0|0) = δp1(1|1) = − pdark
2µtlinkη
.
(B5)
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